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Commission must give reasons justifying the
confidentiality of every document as this would, in itself,
endanger the protection of the public interest.
The principle of non-discrimination embodied in
Article 6 EC was at issue in Case C-323/95 Hayes v.
Kronenberger GmbH, 20 March, 1997, which concerned
a provision of the German Code of Civil Procedure which
provided that foreign nationals who act as plaintiffs in
proceedings brought before German courts must give
security for costs and lawyers fees. The Court held that
such a provision is not in accordance with Community
law as it constitutes direct discrimination on the basis of
nationality. While the Court recognised that there is a real
difficulty in enforcing orders made against non-residents,
it refused to consider whether the imposition of security
for costs might be necessary in some circumstances as the
German rule failed to comply with the principle of
proportionality. In particular, the German law imposed
different conditions depending on nationality, and failed
to secure repayment of judicial costs in all cases, as no
security could be imposed on a German plaintiff not
residing in Germany and having no assets there.  In
addition it was disproportionate to the objective pursued
as non-German plaintiffs residing and having assets in
Germany could also be required to provide security.
Case C-352/95 Phytheron International SA v. Jean
Bourdon, 20 March, 1997, concerned the application of
Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive 89/104/EEC. The
case concerned the cancellation of a contract for the
purchase of a plant health product which was imported to
France from Germany but which was originally from
Turkey. The purchaser cancelled the order on the grounds
that the consignment could not be marketed in France as
the owner of the trade mark had apparently not agreed to
the same. An action for damages on the ground of wrongful
termination of the contract was taken in the national
court. A number of questions were referred to the Court
of Justice, the answer to which depended on the
interpretation of Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive.
Article 7 provides that (1) The trade mark shall not entitle
the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which
have been put on the market in the Community under that
trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent. (2)
Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate
reasons for the proprietor to oppose further
commercialization of the goods, especially where the
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they
have been put on the market.
In its judgement, the Court pointed out that the
Directive reiterates the case-law of the Court to the effect
that the owner of a trade mark protected by the legislation
Judgements delivered in the past few months have
concerned a diverse range of topics. This article will
review some of the more interesting judgements handed
down by the Court of Justice in the aforementioned
period.
An interesting institutional question arose for
consideration before the Court of First Instance in Case T-
105/95 WWF UK (World Wide Fund for Nature) v.
Commission, 5 March, 1997. This case concerned
Decision 94/90 on public access to Commission
documents and the Code of Conduct on public access to
Commission and Council documents.
The Irish government announced a decision to build
a visitors’ centre in the Burren National Park in the west
of Ireland and proposed using structural funds for the
project. The Commission subsequently investigated the
project but decided that it would not start Treaty
infringement proceedings against Ireland. The applicant
in the case then addressed a letter to the Commission
requesting access to all Commission documents relating
to the examination of the project, and in particular
concerning the use of structural funds. The Commission
refused to supply the relevant documents and the applicant
brought an annulment action before the CFI. The first
question concerned the legal force of Decision 94/90,
while the second concerned the scope of the exceptions
provided. With respect to the first issue, the Court
considered that although the Commission voluntarily
assumed the obligations contained in the decision, it was
nevertheless capable of conferring legal rights on third
parties, which the Commission is obliged to respect.
In so far as the exceptions are concerned, the Court
considered that it is necessary to interpret these in a
restrictive fashion and in such a way that they do not
render the objective of the Decision impossible to attain.
In so far as the mandatory exceptions are concerned, the
Commission is obliged to refuse access to documents
falling within their scope. On the other hand, where the
Commission has discretion as to whether or not to refuse
access, it is under an obligation, when exercising this
discretion, to strike a genuine balance between the interest
of the citizen in obtaining access to the documents and its
own interest in protecting the confidentiality of its
deliberations.
In cases where the requested documents relate to
infringement proceedings, the Commission may refuse
access to the documents. However, the Commission
cannot confine itself to invoking the possible opening of
the infringement procedure as a justification and it is at
least required to indicate the reasons why it considers the
requested documents to be related to the possible opening
of such a procedure. This does not mean that the21
of a Member State cannot rely on that legislation to
prevent the importation or marketing of a product which
has been lawfully put on the market in another Member
State by him or with his consent. In addition, the principle
of exhaustion of rights laid down in Article 7 applies
when the owner of the trademark in the state of import and
the owner of the mark in the state of export are the same
person or are economically linked. As long as the product
has been lawfully put on the market in the Member State
from which it has been imported, by the owner of the mark
or with the owner’s consent, it does not matter that it was
manufactured in a non-member country. This also applies
to companies in the same group as the owner.
In so far as Article 7(2) is concerned, the Court reiterated
previous judgements (see e.g.Cases C-427/93, C-429/93
and C-436/93 Bristol-Meyers Squibb and Others 1996
ECR I-3457) to the effect that the principle of exhaustion
of rights does not apply where there are legitimate reasons
for a trade mark owner to oppose further commercialization
of the products. However, the mere addition on the label
of information necessary to comply with the legislation of
the Member State of import does not constitute a legitimate
reason within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Trade
Mark, provided that the label is not so altered that it omits
important information or gives inaccurate information
and provided its presentation is not liable to damage the
reputation of the trade mark and that of its owner
The Free Movement of Persons and Social Security
law was considered in Case 131/95 P.J. Huijbrechts 13
March 1997. This case concerned the application of the
Netherlands Law on the Provision of Income for Elderly
Unemployed Workers and Unemployed Workers suffering
from Partial Incapacity to Work. Ms. Huijbrechts had
worked in the Netherlands while living in Belgium. After
she was laid off, she received unemployment benefit in
Belgium. She subsequently moved to the Netherlands
where she continued to receive unemployment benefit
from Belgium for a three month period. At the end of this
time, she applied for an allowance under Dutch law. Ms.
Hujbrechts was refused this allowance as she did not
fulfil one of the conditions for benefit. This condition
specified that in order to be considered as an unemployed
person, the applicant must have received benefit under
the statutory unemployed provisions in force in the
Netherlands, for the whole period for which the benefit
was payable. The national court referred a question to the
ECJ in order to determine whether this condition was
compatible with Regulation 1408/71. In its judgement,
the Court of Justice pointed out that Article 71(1)(a)(ii) of
the Regulation provides that frontier workers receive
benefit in the state of residence as though it was the State
where he was last employed. However this merely
suspends the obligations of the State where he was last
employed, it does not extinguish them. Consequently,
where an unemployed frontier worker settles in the
Member State in which he was last employed, the
derogation in Article 71(1)(a)(ii) ceases to apply and the
State in which the frontier worker was last employed must
assume its obligations under the Regulation in relation to
unemployment benefit. As a result, unemployment benefit
received in the State of Residence under Article 71(1)(a)(ii)
must be taken into account by the State of Employment as
if the benefit had been received in that State.
Advocate General La Pergola agreed with the
judgement of the Court but linked his decision more
specifically to Article 48 and the Free Movement of
Workers.
Freedom of establishment was at issue in Case C-250/
95 Futura Participations SA, Singer v. Administration
des Contributions which was decided on the 15 of May
last. According to Luxembourgish law, non-resident tax-
payers with a branch in Luxembourg may only carry
forward previous losses if they fulfil two conditions. In
the first place the losses must be economically related to
the income earned in Luxembourg. Secondly, during the
financial year in which the losses were incurred, the
taxpayer is required to have kept and held in Luxembourg
accounts complying with the relevant rules in respect of
the activities carried out there.  The Court was asked
whether these provisions were compatible with Article
52 of the Treaty. In relation to the first point, the Court
said that the fact that the losses must be economically
linked to the income earned in the Member State was in
conformance with the fiscal principle of territoriality and
did not constitute discrimination.  In so far as the second
point was concerned, the Court considered that requiring
a firm to adopt accounting practises complying with
national rules could constitute a restriction within the
terms of Article 52 of the Treaty. The Court then went on
to consider whether the restriction was justified. While
the Court reaffirmed that the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision constitutes an overriding requirement of
general interest capable of constituting a justification, it
considered that in the present case, the national legislation
went beyond what was necessary to achieve this goal.
The Court felt that it should be sufficient if the non-
resident taxpayer be able to demonstrate the amount of
the losses he seeks to carry forward and that the ways of
proving this should not be limited to those provided by
Luxembourgish law.
Competition law was at issue in Case C-282/95 P,
Guerin v. Commission, 18 March 1997, which concerned
the right to bring an action against the Commission for
failure to act under Regulation 17 of the Competition
rules. Guerin had written to the Commission requesting
that the Commission find Volvo France in breach of
Article 85 of the Treaty. The Commission considered that
the case did not present sufficient Community interest
and refused to take an action. Subsequently, the
Commission informed Guerin that it was dealing with the
same problem in another case and that it would
communicate to them the results of the examination. A
year later, Guerin had not received a reply and they
addressed a formal letter of notice to the Commission in
accordance with Article 175 of the Treaty. Subsequently,
Guerin brought the case before the Court of First Instance.
Following this, the Commission sent Guerin a notification
referring to Article 6 of Commission Regulation No 99/
63/EEC and informing them that they did not intend to
give their complaint individual consideration. The Court
of First Instance rejected Guerin’s application on the
basis that the aforementioned notification constituted a
definition of position within Article 175. In addition, it22
ruled that an action for annulment under 173 was
inadmissible as the letters sent by the Commission to
Guerin did not have binding legal effects. In the appeal,
the Court upheld the Court of First Instance on these two
points. However, in its judgement the Court went on to
point out that, following a notification under Article 6, the
complainant is entitled to submit written observations.
Once that stage of the procedure is completed, the
Commission is under an obligation to either initiate a
procedure against the subject of the complaint or to adopt
a definitive decision rejecting the complaint. This latter
course of action may then be the subject-matter of an
action for annulment before the Court.
In Case C-343/95 Diego Cali &Figli Srl v. Servizi
Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG) March 18, 1997,
the Court considered the application of Article 86 to a
body responsible for the surveillance of water pollution
and for providing rapid intervention in order to protect
maritime areas against any pollution caused by accidental
discharges of hydrocarbons into the sea. These activities
were carried out under an exclusive concession granted to
SEPG by the Port Authorities and fees were collected
from the users of the service i.e. vessels which docked at
the wharves in order to carry out operations of loading and
unloading petroleum products. The Court considered that
the SEPG was not an undertaking within the meaning of
Article 86 as the task of anti-pollution surveillance is a
task in the public interest and forms part of the essential
functions of the State. The Court was of the opinion that
such surveillance is connected by its nature, its aim and
it rules with the exercise of powers relating to the protection
of the environment which are typically those of a public
authority and which are not of an economic nature
justifying the application of the Treaty rules on
competition. The fact that SEPG charged fees for its
services did not affect the legal status of the activity.
The question of State aid was considered by the
Court in Case C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz v. Alcan
Deutschland GmbH, 20 March 1997. This concerned the
extent to which the application of national rules may be
relied upon to prevent the recovery of unlawful state aid.
The first question dealt with by the Court concerned
whether national authorities are required to revoke a
decision granting unlawful aid even if the authority has
allowed national time limits to elapse. In response to this
question, the Court pointed out that the recipient of aid is
not in a position of uncertainty after the Commission has
taken a decision to the effect that the aid is illegal. As the
national authorities have no discretion concerning this
matter, the principle of legal certainty cannot be relied
upon to preclude repayment of the aid on the grounds that
the national authorities allowed national time-limits to
elapse
The second question concerned whether the national
authority is obliged to demand recovery of aid even it is
responsible for the illegality of the aid decision to the
extent that revocation appears to constitute a breach of
good faith towards the applicant. The Court considered
that the national authority was obliged to demand recovery
on the grounds that the recipient could not have a legitimate
expectation that the aid was lawful because the procedure
laid down in Article 93 of the Treaty had not been
followed.
Case C-355/95 Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH (TWD) v.
Commission, 15 May, 1997 concerned aid granted to
TWD by the Federal German Government and by the
Land of Bavaria. The Commission held that the original
aid granted was unlawful as it had not been notified and
did not satisfy the conditions set out in Article 92(2) and
(3) of the EEC Treaty.  However it exempted a subsequent
aid plan but instructed the German government to suspend
payment until the original illegal aid had been reimbursed.
A case was brought against the Commission on the basis
that it lacked competence to set out such a condition and
that it had breached the division of powers between the
Community and the Member States. The judgement of
the Court of First Instance subsequently went to the Court
of Justice on appeal. The Court upheld the judgement of
the CFI and agreed that the new aid could not be compatible
with the common market as long as the old unlawful aid
had not been repaid, since the combined effects of all the
aid was to significantly distort competition in the common
market. The Court concluded that in such circumstances,
the suspension of payment of the new aid could not be
treated in the same way as a simple demand for payment
and that the Commission had not acted outside its powers
in imposing such a condition.
A number of decisions were handed down in the field of
social law. The distinction between statutory and
occupational pension schemes was considered in Case C-
147/95  Dimosia Epicheirisi (DEI) v. Evithimos
Evrenopoulus of the 17 April, 1997 which concerned the
application of Article 119 EC and Directive 79/7, to the
Greek State Electricity Company (DEI). Under Greek
law, the DEI is a State body sui generis, it enjoys legal
personality and for most purposes, it is governed by
private law. The DEI insurance scheme was directly
created and exclusively regulated by law. DEI and the
Greek Government argued that the scheme was a statutory
scheme and that Article 119 could therefore not apply to
it. In support of this argument, they pointed out that the
scheme was directly created and exclusively regulated by
statute; that in operating such a scheme the DEI acts as a
body governed by public law; the scheme was not created
by a unilateral decision on the part of the employer or after
negotiation or agreement between management and staff;
that the detailed rules for its operation are linked to social
policy and not to an employment relationship; that its role
is not to supplement another general insurance scheme.
However, the ECJ did not accept these arguments and
considered that the scheme did fall within Article 119 as
the right to a survivors pension under the scheme depended
on the beneficiary’s spouse being employed by the
Company and was therefore linked to the latter’s pay.
In this case, the ECJ also dealt with the question of the
temporal limitations set out in Case C-262/88 Barber
1990 ECR I-1889. In relation to this matter, the Court
pointed out in order for the temporal limitations not to
apply, the action must have been initiated in accordance
with the procedural rules applicable in the Member State
concerned.
Case C-66/95 The Queen v. The Secretary of State for
Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton 22 April 1997,
concerned the right to obtain interest on arrears of social
security benefit falling within the scope of Council23
Directive 79/7. Mrs. Sutton had been discriminated against
under the British Social Security regime and had received
arrears of payment backdated to 1986. However she was
not paid any interest in respect of this sum. The national
court asked the Court of Justice whether this was
compatible with Article 6 of the Directive. In its response,
the ECJ drew a distinction between the current case and
Marshall II. In this respect, the Court pointed out that
Marshall II concerned the award of interest on amounts
payable by way of reparation for loss and damage
sustained. The award of interest in such an instance is
necessary in order to ensure full compensation of the loss
and damage. These considerations do not come into play
in cases concerning the right to receive interest on amounts
payable by way of social security benefits, as these
amounts do not constitute reparation for loss or damage.
However the Court did point out that the Member State
may remain liable under the Francovich doctrine for any
loss suffered as a result of the belated payments.
Case C-180/95 Draehmpael v. Urania Immobilien-
service ohG, 22 April 1997, concerned the right to
reparation in the event of discrimination as regards access
to employment. Mr. Draehmpael was discriminated
against in the decision on an appointment to the post of
assistant. However his right to compensation depended
partially on Community law. The first question referred
by the national judge asked whether Directive 76/207
precludes provisions of domestic law which make
reparation of damage suffered as a result of sexual
discrimination subject to the requirement of fault. The
ECJ held that the directive precludes making reparation
subject to such a requirement. The national court also
raised the issue of whether the Directive precludes
provisions of domestic law which place a limit of three
months salary on the amount of compensation which may
be awarded in sexual discrimination cases. In responding
to this question, the Court referred to its judgement in the
Von Colson case 1984 ECR 1891, where it ruled that if a
Member State chooses to penalise the breach of the
prohibition of discrimination by the award of
compensation, that compensation must not be purely
nominal and must in any event be adequate in relation to
the damage sustained. While the German government
sought to argue that three months salary was not purely
nominal, the Court refused to accept this argument. The
Court pointed out that the three month ceiling was not
imposed for other provisions of domestic civil and labour
law and that it consequently breached the requirement
that infringements of Community law be punished under
conditions analogous to those applicable to infringements
of domestic law.
In so far as applicants who were discriminated against
in the recruitment procedure but who would not have
obtained the position even if the selection process had
been free of discrimination are concerned, the Court ruled
that reparation may take account of the fact that they
would not have been selected anyway and that such
applicants cannot claim that the extent of the damage they
have sustained is the same as that sustained by applicants
who would have obtained the position in the absence of
discrimination. In such a situation, the Court did not think
that it would be unreasonable for a Member State to lay
down a statutory presumption that the damage suffered
may not exceed a ceiling of three months salary. However
it is the employer who must adduce proof that the applicant
would not have obtained the vacant position even if there
had been no discrimination.
Finally the Court held that provisions of national law
which placed a limit on the aggregate amount of
compensation payable to several applicants discriminated
against on grounds of sex, were also in conflict with
Community law as similar conditions were not applied to
other provisions of domestic civil and labour
Case C-400/95, Elisabeth Larsson, 29 May, 1997
concerned the treatment of illness resulting from
pregnancy. Ms. Larsson became ill following her
pregnancy, as a result of her pregnancy. Her employer
terminated her employment contract on the basis that she
would not be able to carry out her work in a satisfactory
manner in the foreseeable future. Mrs. Larsson claimed
that her dismissal was contrary to Council Directive 76/
207 on the implementation of the equal treatment principle
as regards access to employment, vocational training and
promotion, and working conditions. In its judgement, the
Court confirmed its decision in the Hertz case 1990 ECR
3979 and held that there is no reason to distinguish
between illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement
from any other illness and that illness resulting from
pregnancy should be treated according to the general
rules applicable in the event of illness. Consequently, the
Directive does not prevent dismissal based on periods of
absence due to illness attributable to pregnancy or
confinement.
Case 13/95 Suzen of the 11 March, 1997 concerned
the definition of the term ‘transfer of undertaking’ in
Directive 77/187/EEC. The Court was asked whether a
situation where a school terminated a cleaning contract
with one undertaking and subsequently awarded the
contract to another undertaking could constitute a transfer
within the meaning of the Directive. The Court considered
that the Directive did not apply to such a situation as there
had been no transfer of an economic entity. In this respect,
the Court pointed out that the mere loss of a service
contract to a competitor does not mean that the service
undertaking previously holding the contract ceases fully
to exist and that there were no grounds for concluding that
a business or part of a business belonging to it had been
transferred to the new awardee of the contract.
The relationship between Community law and the
European Convention on Human Rights was considered
in Case C-299/95 Kremzow v. Republic Osterrich 29
May, 1997. In this case, a number of questions referred by
the Austrian court concerned the competence of the Court
to give a preliminary ruling with respect to the
interpretation of all or some of the substantive provisions
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Rights. The Court held that it is
not competent to give a preliminary ruling on the
interpretation of the Convention when the case at issue
before the national court does not fall within the field of
application of Community law.  ❑